skills/lev-os/agents/openclaw-config/Gen Agent Trust Hub

openclaw-config

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides instructions to access and verify sensitive file paths that contain authentication material, specifically:
  • ~/.openclaw/credentials/telegram/*/token.txt (Telegram bot tokens)
  • ~/.openclaw/credentials/bird/cookies.json (Twitter/X session cookies)
  • ~/.openclaw/agents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json (Anthropic authentication tokens)
  • ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json (Main configuration file containing API keys and provider tokens)
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is delivered through complex bash command blocks. It performs system process monitoring (ps), file system operations (cp, mv, rm), and interacts with local databases (sqlite3). It also includes instructions for spawning background processes and orchestrating sub-agents with arbitrary command strings.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the clawdhub utility and npx to download and install external 'skills' and extensions from remote repositories at runtime.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from various sources:
  • Ingestion points: Processes chat transcripts (.jsonl files), daily workspace memory files (.md), and gateway logs (.log) which contain user-generated content.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when reading these files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has extensive system capabilities including shell execution, file writing, and managing external communication tools (signal-cli).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content read from session transcripts or logs before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 09:43 AM