skill-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/setup.mdfile instructs the user to execute a remote Python script directly from a non-trusted GitHub repository (yusufkaraaslan/Skill_Seekers) using thecurl | python3pattern, which bypasses package integrity and safety checks.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/enhance-workaround.shpipes prompt content containing raw data scraped from the internet directly into theclaude -pcommand. This creates a significant execution path for arbitrary instructions retrieved from external documentation or code repositories.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow utilizes high-privilege execution flags such as--dangerously-skip-permissionsand performs numerous shell operations (git clone,mv,chmod) on potentially untrusted content fetched from the web.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The core design of the skill (converting external documentation into new agent skills) creates a major surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in a target website or repository could be promoted to the agent's active skill library during the 'enhance' or 'install' phases without sufficient isolation or sanitization.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata