qmd
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill's metadata (
SKILL.md) defines an installation commandbun install -g https://github.com/tobi/qmd. This executes code from an untrusted external repository without version pinning or integrity verification. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill documentation states that it 'auto-downloads' GGUF models on the first run. The source of these models is unspecified, posing a risk of malicious model injection or exploitation of the local inference engine.
- PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS (MEDIUM): The 'Maintenance' and 'Keeping the index fresh' sections encourage users to configure cron jobs (e.g.,
0 * * * * ... qmd update). While intended for indexing, this establishes a mechanism for recurring background execution of the untrusted binary. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (MEDIUM): The skill is designed to ingest and index local markdown files (
qmd collection add). If an attacker places a malicious markdown file in an indexed directory, they could potentially influence the agent's reasoning or behavior when the content is retrieved during a search operation. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill relies on executing shell commands (
qmd search,qmd vsearch) and requires specific system dependencies like SQLite extensions, which increases the local attack surface.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata