ln-110-project-docs-coordinator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill intentionally accesses sensitive system configuration files that may contain infrastructure secrets or network topologies.
- Evidence: Scanning
~/.ssh/configto extract SSH aliases, hostnames, and IP addresses for the 'SERVER_INVENTORY' field. - Evidence: Extracting artifact repository URLs and registry settings from
.npmrc. - Evidence: Parsing
.env.examplefiles which, while often sanitized, can occasionally contain sensitive default values or reveal internal environment naming conventions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes system commands and performs deep file system discovery to gather context.
- Evidence: Execution of
git logto extract frequent committer names and emails. - Evidence: Recursive scanning of directory structures including
src/andmigrations/. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points:
README.md,package.json,CODEOWNERS, and git history are read directly into the agent context (SKILL.md Phase 1.1). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when building the Context Store.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to invoke multiple sub-skills (ln-111 through ln-115) and use MCP tools like
mcp__RefandWebSearch(SKILL.md Phase 2). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the strings extracted from project files before they are passed to the Context Store and subsequent workers.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata