ln-300-task-coordinator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the processing of external task data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from
storyId(via CLI args, git branch names, or kanban entries), Story Acceptance Criteria (AC), and Technical Notes (Phase 2). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the story content are defined.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell-based
grepcommands on the local source code and delegates task operations to worker skills (ln-301,ln-302) withautoApprove=true(Phase 4). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the story content before it is used to build plans or passed to workers.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated discovery by executing commands on the local environment.
- Evidence: Phase 2 explicitly instructs the agent to "Grep
src/for error handlers, validators, utilities" to find reusable patterns. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses multiple sensitive local project files to discover context.
- Evidence: It reads
docs/tasks/kanban_board.md,CLAUDE.md, and any files matching technical notes or context for the story being processed.
Audit Metadata