ln-910-community-engagement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from multiple sources including GitHub discussions, issues, PRs, and project-local files like
CHANGELOG.mdanddocs/community_engagement_strategy.md. - Ingestion points: Data is gathered via
gh api graphql,git log, and reading local files (CHANGELOG.md,docs/community_engagement_strategy.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore" directives to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the analyzed community content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute shell commands and theSkilltool to delegate tasks to other worker skills. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from GitHub or local documentation before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes a fallback mechanism to fetch reference files and templates from the author's GitHub repository (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills/master/) using theWebFetchtool if local files are missing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to interact with the system, specifically executinggh(GitHub CLI) for API queries andgitfor log analysis and changelog inspection.
Audit Metadata