ln-910-community-engagement

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from multiple sources including GitHub discussions, issues, PRs, and project-local files like CHANGELOG.md and docs/community_engagement_strategy.md.
  • Ingestion points: Data is gathered via gh api graphql, git log, and reading local files (CHANGELOG.md, docs/community_engagement_strategy.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore" directives to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the analyzed community content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute shell commands and the Skill tool to delegate tasks to other worker skills.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from GitHub or local documentation before it is processed by the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes a fallback mechanism to fetch reference files and templates from the author's GitHub repository (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills/master/) using the WebFetch tool if local files are missing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to interact with the system, specifically executing gh (GitHub CLI) for API queries and git for log analysis and changelog inspection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 07:59 PM