ln-912-community-announcer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
gitto extract commit history and file differences to provide context for the announcement, and it employs theghCLI to interact with the GitHub GraphQL API for the publication phase. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches configuration and reference Markdown files from the author's own GitHub repository (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills) usingWebFetchas a fallback when local copies are unavailable. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from the repository (such as
CHANGELOG.mdand source code files) to compose its announcements, which presents an indirect injection surface. This is effectively mitigated by a mandatory user-approval gate and a multi-step fact-checking protocol. Ingestion points: Local repository files includingCHANGELOG.md,README.md, and source code. Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompt instructions. Capability inventory: Local file access, shell command execution, and network writing via the GitHub CLI. Sanitization: Relies on a verification phase (Phase 4) and a final human-in-the-loop review (Phase 5) before publication.
Audit Metadata