matchms
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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation explicitly lists 'Pickle (Python serialization)' as a supported data format for importing and exporting mass spectrometry data.
- Evidence: Found in 'Supported formats' list within the Importing and Exporting section of SKILL.md.
- Risk: The Python
picklemodule is inherently unsafe. Deserializing untrusted data can result in the execution of arbitrary code within the agent's environment. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection via ingestion of external scientific data files.
- Ingestion points: Functions such as
load_from_mgf,load_from_mzml,load_from_msp, andload_from_jsoningest data from external files. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes file writing capabilities (
save_as_...) and potential execution via the aforementioned pickle support. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of data sanitization or validation of metadata fields that might contain malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata