pdb-database

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill performs network operations using requests.get and the rcsb-api package to fetch data from rcsb.org and its subdomains (files.rcsb.org, data.rcsb.org). While these are reputable scientific sources, they are not on the pre-defined trust whitelist.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill demonstrates the ability to write downloaded content directly to the local file system (e.g., open(f"{pdb_id}.pdb", "w").write(response.text)). This capability, combined with external data ingestion, presents a risk if the source were compromised.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (MEDIUM): In line with Category 8 analysis:
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via fetch() (GraphQL/REST) and requests.get() from external PDB servers.
  • Boundary markers: None present. The retrieved metadata (titles, descriptions, organism names) is processed and printed without delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses network read capabilities and local file-write capabilities.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved text is observed before it is used in logic or displayed. A malicious entry in the PDB database could theoretically influence the agent's behavior.
  • UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES (LOW): The skill requires rcsb-api, rcsbsearchapi, requests, and biopython. These are standard tools in the bioinformatics community but should be pinned to specific versions to prevent supply chain attacks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:02 PM