youtube-transcript

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Natural language instruction to download and install from URL detected (CI009) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill is consistent with its stated purpose (downloading subtitles and transcribing audio). I found no evidence of hidden backdoors, hard-coded credentials, obfuscated malicious code, or exfiltration to unexpected third-party domains. The primary risks are supply-chain and operational: it installs software from package managers and executes external binaries (yt-dlp, whisper), which is expected but increases attack surface if those upstream distributions are compromised or if the script is run unattended. Prompting the user before Whisper installation mitigates some risk, but automated installation attempts for yt-dlp and invoking sudo apt could be surprising in some environments. Recommend ensuring the user runs this interactively, vets installs, and runs in an environment where package installs and subprocess execution are acceptable. LLM verification: The document describes a legitimate YouTube-transcript downloader/transcriber workflow. I found no explicit malicious code, hardcoded credentials, or hidden network destinations. Main security concerns are operational and supply-chain: unpinned pip installs, use of shell command substitution without sanitization (risk of command injection or unsafe filenames), and no recommendations for installing/verifying third-party tools in isolated environments. If executed automatically or by an unprivileg