ljg-clip

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by fetching and processing arbitrary content from external URLs.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the agent context via WebFetch for URLs and through raw text provided by the user.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when processing the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can read/write to ~/Documents/notes/inbox.org, execute the date system command, and trigger other analysis skills (/ljg-xray).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation before the data is formatted into Org-mode and saved locally or passed to subsequent tools.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the system command date '+[%Y-%m-%d %a %H:%M]' to generate timestamps for its entries. This is a standard utility but involves the execution of a shell command.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from arbitrary remote URLs using the WebFetch tool. While this is the primary purpose of the skill, it involves interaction with untrusted external sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 27, 2026, 07:36 AM