doc-coauthoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process data from external sources provided by the user.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via shared document links (Google Drive, SharePoint), user-uploaded files, and integrated messaging platform channels (Slack, Teams) as specified in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or system-level warnings to distinguish between user-provided data and the agent's core operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
create_fileandstr_replacetools and has the potential to interact with productivity software APIs via Model Context Protocol (MCP) integrations. - Sanitization: There is no defined process for sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from external links or files before the agent processes it for document drafting.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates with well-known productivity and communication services to retrieve content.
- Evidence: The workflow references fetching context from Google Drive, SharePoint, Slack, and Microsoft Teams.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use specific tools for file system management during the drafting process.
- Evidence: Uses
create_fileto generate document scaffolding andstr_replaceto perform granular updates to the draft files.
Audit Metadata