citation-management
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (HIGH): The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdinclude a command that attempts to scrape an API key from a specific local path:/Users/lingzhi/Code/keys.md. This hardcoded path targets a specific user environment and risks exposure of sensitive information. Evidence:$(grep S2_API_Key /Users/lingzhi/Code/keys.md ...). - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill uses shell command substitution (
$(...)) to execute a pipeline of commands includinggrep,cut, andtron the host system. - DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The
harvest_citations.pyscript reads local.texand.bibfiles and transmits search queries derived from their content to the Semantic Scholar API. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted LaTeX data and uses it in network operations. 1. Ingestion points:
harvest_citations.py(via--texand--bibarguments). 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Network requests viaurllib.request. 4. Sanitization: Absent; content extracted from files is used directly in URL-encoded search queries.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata