literature-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions attempt to read an API key from a hardcoded sensitive file path at /Users/lingzhi/Code/keys.md.
  • The extracted key is passed directly as a command-line argument (--api-key), which can expose the secret in the system's process table (e.g., via ps commands) to other local users.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell command substitution ($(grep ... )) within SKILL.md to dynamically inject secrets into execution context.
  • Multiple Python scripts are invoked via the shell, relying on the environment to manage execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts natural language search queries from the user ($ARGUMENTS) and interpolates them into shell commands, creating a potential surface for injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md accepts search queries from the user.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and write to the local filesystem.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used to separate user input from command instructions.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform explicit sanitization or validation of the search query before it is passed to script arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads academic metadata and source code from well-known academic services.
  • It fetches paper details from the arXiv API and downloads source tarballs from arxiv.org.
  • It queries the CrossRef API (api.crossref.org) and the OpenAlex API (api.openalex.org) for bibliographic data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 01:09 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — literature-search