latex-formatting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/latex_checker.pyusessubprocess.runto programmatically callscripts/clean_latex.pywhen the--fixflag is enabled. Although it avoids usingshell=Trueand uses a list for arguments, it invokes external script execution based on the user-provided.texfile path. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
load_texfunction inscripts/latex_checker.pyimplements a recursive file resolution mechanism for LaTeX\input{}directives. This implementation lacks path validation or sanitization, making it vulnerable to directory traversal attacks. An attacker could provide a malicious LaTeX file containing\input{../../.ssh/id_rsa}to trick the agent into reading and potentially exposing sensitive file contents through the checker's output or error messages. - Ingestion points: The
load_texfunction inscripts/latex_checker.py(line 45) reads file paths from LaTeX commands. - Boundary markers: Absent; the content of included files is merged directly into the processing buffer without delimiters.
- Capability inventory:
subprocess.run(line 254) inscripts/latex_checker.pyand file-write operations inscripts/clean_latex.py(line 213). - Sanitization: Absent; the script does not check if the resolved path for
\inputremains within the project directory.
Audit Metadata