pm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface by ingesting untrusted external data and possessing file-write capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads from
frontend/,backend/, andprd/index.csvduring the 'Research' phase (File: SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed source code or existing documentation.
- Capability inventory: The agent can create directories, write/append to
context.mdandrequirement.md, updateindex.csv, and copy files to therd/dev/directory (File: SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content read from the codebase is performed before it is used to drive automated phases.
- Data Exposure (LOW): The skill accesses the local filesystem to read source code and indices. While this is expected behavior for a PM tool, it creates a vector for sensitive information to be processed and potentially moved across directories (e.g., from
prd/tord/dev/).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata