vx-provider-updater
Audited by Socket on Feb 20, 2026
1 alert found:
Malware[Skill Scanner] URL pointing to executable file detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: URL pointing to executable file detected (CI010) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] The fragment is benign documentation and templating guidance with coherent alignment to its stated purpose. It does not contain executable payloads or credential handling. Security risks arise mainly from user misconfiguration or template misuse during adoption rather than from embedded malicious behavior. Recommended mitigation includes enforcing input validation, URL verification, and integrating checksums for downloaded artifacts during actual implementation. LLM verification: The fragment serves as documentation/guidance for updater tooling to standardize VX provider manifests and implement RFC-based layouts and PM fallbacks. It is not executable code, but the templates contain potential misuse vectors if adopted without proper validation and separation of documentation from code. Approach: treat as benign documentation with careful validation of URLs, removal of hard-coded credentials, and strict separation of templates from executable logic to prevent unintended do