proposal
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a dynamic instruction loading pattern where the core logic is hidden within an AES-256-GCM encrypted file (
SKILL.md.enc). The agent is instructed to decrypt and follow these instructions at runtime, which bypasses static analysis and allows for potential changes in behavior without updating the visible skill files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To function, the skill relies on the execution of a custom shell command
lovstudio-activate decrypt proposal. This command is executed on every invocation to retrieve the decrypted instructions, creating a dependency on local binary execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation directs users to install an external Python package
lovstudio-activateusingpipx. While this tool belongs to the skill's vendor, installing and running unverified CLI tools from external sources represents a supply chain risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted requirement documents (docx, pdf, md) provided by users or external clients, which is a known vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Processes client requirement documents and verbal descriptions from
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present to protect the agent from malicious content within the requirements.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (
lovstudio-activate), generate images (illustrate), and write PDF files (any2pdf). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input document content is mentioned in the provided skill files.
Audit Metadata