skills/luongnv89/skills/system-design/Gen Agent Trust Hub

system-design

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated shell operations using git to synchronize the working environment and push changes to a remote repository. It is explicitly configured to bypass the confirmation step for push operations.\n
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (Phase 7) contains the instruction: "Do not ask for additional push permission once this skill is invoked."\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill attempts to execute a local Python script to maintain repository metadata, which constitutes dynamic execution of local code.\n
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (Phase 6) calls python3 scripts/update_readme_ideas_index.py if the project is within an ideas repository.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructional overrides that mandate certain behaviors and suppress standard safety or confirmation prompts.\n
  • Evidence: Use of "mandatory" markers and explicit instructions to "Do not ask for additional push permission" in SKILL.md.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves processing untrusted external data (PRD files) to generate output and perform repository actions, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: prd.md, idea.md, and validate.md in the project folder.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested files.\n
  • Capability inventory: Writing files, executing shell commands (git), and executing local scripts (python3).\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering is applied to the content extracted from the PRD files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 09:47 PM