skills/lv416e/dotfiles/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively utilizes subprocess.run to execute system binaries including soffice (LibreOffice), pandoc, pdftoppm, and gcc. These executions often use file paths and parameters derived from user input.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: As part of its environment configuration, scripts/office/soffice.py contains a hardcoded C source string which is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime using gcc. The resulting shared library is then injected into the soffice process using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. Additionally, scripts/accept_changes.py generates and executes LibreOffice Basic macros at runtime.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The SKILL.md documentation provides instructions for the user to install the docx package globally via the official NPM registry.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. 1. Ingestion points: scripts/office/unpack.py and pandoc extract content from untrusted Word documents provided by users. 2. Boundary markers: The skill does not employ delimiters or instructions to isolate ingested content from agent commands. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including file system access, sub-process execution, and runtime code compilation. 4. Sanitization: While defusedxml is used to mitigate XML-based attacks, there is no sanitization of the natural language content extracted from the documents.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 10:36 PM