docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively utilizes
subprocess.runto execute system binaries includingsoffice(LibreOffice),pandoc,pdftoppm, andgcc. These executions often use file paths and parameters derived from user input. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: As part of its environment configuration,
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string which is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime usinggcc. The resulting shared library is then injected into thesofficeprocess using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. Additionally,scripts/accept_changes.pygenerates and executes LibreOffice Basic macros at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mddocumentation provides instructions for the user to install thedocxpackage globally via the official NPM registry. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. 1. Ingestion points:
scripts/office/unpack.pyandpandocextract content from untrusted Word documents provided by users. 2. Boundary markers: The skill does not employ delimiters or instructions to isolate ingested content from agent commands. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including file system access, sub-process execution, and runtime code compilation. 4. Sanitization: Whiledefusedxmlis used to mitigate XML-based attacks, there is no sanitization of the natural language content extracted from the documents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata