pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and process injection.
- Evidence: In
scripts/office/soffice.py, the skill defines a C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that implements a socket shim. The_ensure_shimfunction writes this source to a temporary file and compiles it into a shared object usinggcc. The resulting library is then dynamically loaded into the LibreOffice (soffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is an aggressive technique used to modify the behavior of system calls at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of system binaries via subprocess.
- Evidence: Multiple utility scripts (
soffice.py,thumbnail.py,pack.py,validate.py) invoke external command-line tools includinggcc,soffice,git, andpdftoppm. These calls are made usingsubprocess.runwith parameters that can include user-provided file paths. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface via document processing.
- Evidence: The skill ingests untrusted data from external Office documents which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: XML content is extracted from user-provided
.pptx,.docx, and.xlsxfiles inscripts/office/unpack.pyand via themarkitdowndependency. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings when presenting extracted text to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities across its scripts, including arbitrary file writes, file deletions (
scripts/clean.py), and process execution (scripts/office/soffice.py). - Sanitization: While the skill uses
defusedxmlto mitigate XML-based attacks (XXE), there is no sanitization or escaping of the natural language content extracted from the documents before it is processed by the AI agent.
Audit Metadata