rust-skill-creator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest untrusted external data and transform it into executable agent skills, a classic Indirect Prompt Injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: The skill accepts arbitrary URLs via the /create-llms-for-skills command as seen in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the fetched documentation.
  • Capability inventory: The workflow culminates in the /create-skills-via-llms command which writes persistent skill files to the filesystem at ~/.claude/skills/ (noted in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined to prevent the scraped documentation from containing malicious instructions that would then be saved as a new skill.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill facilitates downloading and processing content from any URL provided by the user or constructed from crate names.
  • While documentation sites like docs.rs are common, the workflow explicitly supports 'Custom URLs' which allows an attacker to point the agent to a malicious server hosting a tailored llms.txt payload.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the agent to execute custom slash commands (/create-llms-for-skills and /create-skills-via-llms) that perform network operations and local file modifications.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:16 PM