plantuml

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the processing of untrusted markdown and diagram files.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/process_markdown_puml.py and scripts/resilient_processor.py ingest data from user-provided .md and .puml files.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The scripts extract content based on standard markdown code block delimiters without additional security boundaries.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes subprocess commands (java -jar plantuml.jar) and has full read/write access to the local workspace.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The scripts do not sanitize PlantUML preprocessor directives such as !include or !includeurl, which can be exploited to read sensitive local files or perform server-side request forgery (SSRF) if the environment is not restricted.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (scripts/convert_puml.py, scripts/check_setup.py, scripts/resilient_processor.py) use the subprocess module to execute system commands including java and dot (Graphviz). While they correctly use argument lists instead of shell strings to mitigate injection, they provide a broad capability to execute any code packaged within the provided plantuml.jar file.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation (README.md, references/plantuml_reference.md) instructs users to download the plantuml.jar executable from external sources such as SourceForge and the official PlantUML website. While these are well-known and reputable services, they represent unmanaged external dependencies that execute with system privileges.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 03:13 AM