avo-coder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill exhibits a significant Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8). It is explicitly instructed to fetch external documentation (
https://docs.avohq.io/3.0/llms-full.txt) and follow its patterns for subsequent code generation and execution. - Ingestion points:
WebFetchoperation inSKILL.mdtargeting an external domain. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to treat the external content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
Bash,Write, andEditpermissions, allowing it to modify the local filesystem and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or validation of the content fetched from the remote documentation source.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill performs runtime network requests to
docs.avohq.ioto retrieve executable instructions (documentation). This domain is not within the pre-defined [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE] list, posing a risk if the source is compromised or spoofed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill uses the
Bashtool to run Rails generators (bin/rails generate). While this is standard for the skill's stated purpose, it serves as the primary execution vector if the agent is manipulated via the external documentation source.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata