clash-doctor

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The diagnostic routines utilize the $ARGUMENTS variable to populate shell command templates, including nslookup, ping, and curl. This pattern creates a risk of command injection if the AI agent passes unsanitized user input into these bash executions.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the Clash Verge application data directory located at ~/Library/Application Support/io.github.clash-verge-rev.clash-verge-rev. This path contains profiles.yaml and other configuration files that store sensitive information such as proxy server credentials, subscription tokens, and access keys.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs active reconnaissance on the local machine by scanning a range of network ports (e.g., 7890, 7897, 9097) using lsof to determine which proxy services are active.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data by reading and merging remote proxy subscription configurations into local files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: profiles.yaml and YAML files in the profiles/ subdirectory. 2. Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions that might be embedded in remote configuration files. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute bash commands and perform file write/edit operations based on the contents of these configurations. 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or structural validation for the YAML content fetched from remote subscriptions before it is processed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 4, 2026, 04:33 PM