adaptive-subagents
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to log routing decisions to a local file using a Bash command that interpolates user-influenced content.
- Evidence: The instruction
echo "{model} | ... | {brief task description}" >> routing.logdirectly inserts the variable{brief task description}into a shell command. - Risk: If a user provides a task description containing shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, command substitution, or semicolons), it could result in unintended command execution when the agent attempts to log the entry.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to the way it delegates tasks to subagents.
- Ingestion points: User requests are decomposed and passed to subagents via the
Agenttool in theSKILL.mdfile. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to isolate user-provided task descriptions when they are passed into the subagent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: Subagents have access to sensitive tools including
Read,Glob,Grep,Edit, andWrite(depending onsubagent_type). - Sanitization: There is no instruction to sanitize or escape user-provided content before it is interpolated into subagent prompts.
Audit Metadata