apify-content-analytics
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The skill accesses the
.envfile, which is a sensitive file path, and usesgrepto extract theAPIFY_TOKEN. This practice exposes credentials to the shell environment and potential process logging. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Step 2 and Step 4 construct shell commands that interpolate environment variables (
APIFY_TOKEN) and user-provided inputs (ACTOR_ID,JSON_INPUT). This structure is highly vulnerable to command injection if inputs are not strictly validated. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The workflow requires the global installation of the
@apify/mcpcpackage. Since 'Apify' is not listed as a trusted organization in the security scope, this dependency is treated as unverifiable. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill dynamically fetches and processes Actor schemas and README content from the external Apify registry.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from
mcp.apify.comusing themcpctool in Step 2. - Boundary markers: Absent; the external content is piped directly to
jqand presented to the agent without delimiters. - Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for shell command execution, file system access (reading
.env), and running local Node.js scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the retrieved actor details before they are processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata