k8s-ops

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (HIGH): The skill contains a pre-configured command to retrieve and base64-decode Kubernetes secrets (kubectl get secret <name> -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d) in SKILL.md. This allows an agent to easily expose sensitive credentials.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): Several operations in SKILL.md use direct interpolation of user-controlled variables (e.g., <command>, <pod>, <manifest>) into shell commands. Specifically, kubectl exec <pod> -n <ns> -- <command> and kubectl run debug ... -- <command> provide a direct path for arbitrary command execution within containers.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to process external Kubernetes manifests (kubectl apply -f <manifest>) and execute commands within existing pods.
  • Ingestion points: <manifest>, <pod>, <namespace>, and <command> placeholders in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; untrusted data is directly inserted into command strings.
  • Capability inventory: Full cluster administrative rights including resource application, deletion, and remote shell execution across all scripts in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent; no validation or escaping of input parameters is performed.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (MEDIUM): Operations such as kubectl port-forward, kubectl logs, and kubectl get -o yaml in SKILL.md can be leveraged to extract sensitive cluster configuration or application data to the user's local environment or an external endpoint.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:02 PM