auto-skill-guide
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The documentation and installation script promote the global installation of the
@matrixy/auto-skillnpm package and encourage users to add community skills from arbitrary repositories vianpx skills add owner/repo. These sources are outside the trusted organization scope.\n- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill executesnpm install -gandnpxcommands, which download and execute code from the npm registry. Theinstall-cli.shscript automates this process, potentially bypassing manual review of the package contents.\n- DYNAMIC_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill's core functionality involves observing agent tool sequences, generatingSKILL.mdfiles from these patterns, and loading them into the active session. This runtime assembly of instructions from observed behavior is a form of dynamic code loading that could be manipulated to execute unintended logic.\n- INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill creates an attack surface where malicious data processed by the agent could influence the 'workflow patterns' detected and subsequently turned into active skills.\n - Ingestion points: Pattern detection logic in
SKILL.mdmonitors all tool calls via aPostToolUsehook.\n - Boundary markers: Uses text delimiters (e.g.,
SKILL LOADED) but lacks cryptographic signing or integrity checks for generated skills.\n - Capability inventory: Capable of writing files to
~/.claude/skills/auto/and injecting those instructions into the LLM context.\n - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or safety filtering for the observed tool sequences before they are converted into permanent skills.
Audit Metadata