triage-issue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub issue titles and bodies, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
gh issue view(issue title, body, and author) inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill correctly identifies the risk of shell injection and mandates the use of the heredoc pattern for
--bodyarguments toghcommands. However, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the LLM to ignore embedded commands within the issue body itself. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including file system access (read/write), network operations via
gh(commenting, creating PRs), and code execution viacargo. - Sanitization: No content-level sanitization or filtering is applied to the issue body before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of powerful command-line tools to perform its tasks.
- Evidence: It executes
gh(GitHub CLI),git(version control), andcargo(Rust build tool/test runner). - Context: While these are necessary for issue triage,
cargo testandcargo runcan execute arbitrary code defined in the repository's tests orbuild.rsfiles. The skill assumes the repository being triaged is trusted.
Audit Metadata