managing-agents

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill implements a workflow system where the output of one agent (e.g., a 'security-scanner') is passed directly to another agent (e.g., 'general-purpose') for analysis using syntax like Analyze {findings}. This creates a high-severity injection surface where malicious data in the '{findings}' variable can override the instructions of the subsequent agent.
  • Ingestion points: Workflow step outputs and file content from temp-agents/ and agents/ directories.
  • Boundary markers: None visible in the provided prompt interpolation examples.
  • Capability inventory: The system executes agents that have access to tools like Grep, Read, and Edit (file system modification).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping for the {findings} placeholder.
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (HIGH): The file external-agents.json and available-agents.md explicitly reference and manage files in the ~/.claude/ directory. Accessing the user's home directory configuration files for AI agents is a sensitive operation that exposes local configuration and potentially sensitive agent definitions.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill enables the creation and execution of custom agents with file system tools (Read, Grep, Edit). While this is a core feature, the lack of strict boundaries around the instructions these agents follow when processing external data increases the risk of unauthorized file modifications.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 05:31 AM