oauth
SKILL.md
When to use
Use this skill when you need to:
- Implement or debug an OAuth 2.0/2.1 flow in a Fastify application
- Validate tokens, configure PKCE, or set up refresh token rotation
- Secure Fastify routes and plugins with access-control middleware
- Resolve RFC compliance questions or identify security anti-patterns
Step-by-step: Authorization Code + PKCE in Fastify
1. Install dependencies
npm install @fastify/oauth2 @fastify/cookie @fastify/session fastify-plugin
2. Register the OAuth plugin
// plugins/oauth.ts
import fp from 'fastify-plugin'
import oauth2, { OAuth2Namespace } from '@fastify/oauth2'
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify'
export default fp(async function (fastify: FastifyInstance) {
fastify.register(oauth2, {
name: 'oauth2',
scope: ['openid', 'profile', 'email'],
credentials: {
client: {
id: process.env.CLIENT_ID!,
secret: process.env.CLIENT_SECRET!,
},
auth: {
authorizeHost: process.env.AUTH_SERVER!,
authorizePath: '/authorize',
tokenHost: process.env.AUTH_SERVER!,
tokenPath: '/token',
},
},
startRedirectPath: '/login',
callbackUri: process.env.CALLBACK_URI!,
pkce: 'S256', // RFC 7636 — always use for public clients
generateStateFunction: (req) => req.session.state = crypto.randomUUID(),
checkStateFunction: (req, callback) =>
req.query.state === req.session.state ? callback() : callback(new Error('State mismatch')),
})
})
Validation checkpoint: Confirm callbackUri exactly matches a registered redirect URI at the authorization server before proceeding (RFC 6749 §3.1.2).
3. Handle the callback and exchange the code
// routes/auth.ts
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify'
export default async function authRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance) {
fastify.get('/login/callback', async (request, reply) => {
// @fastify/oauth2 verifies state and exchanges code automatically
const tokenResponse = await fastify.oauth2.getAccessTokenFromAuthorizationCodeFlow(request)
// Store only what you need; never log the raw token
request.session.set('accessToken', tokenResponse.token.access_token)
request.session.set('refreshToken', tokenResponse.token.refresh_token)
return reply.redirect('/')
})
fastify.get('/logout', async (request, reply) => {
await request.session.destroy()
return reply.redirect('/')
})
}
4. JWT validation middleware (token introspection hook)
// hooks/verifyToken.ts
import { FastifyRequest, FastifyReply } from 'fastify'
import jwt from '@fastify/jwt'
export async function verifyToken(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
try {
await request.jwtVerify()
// Validate required claims (RFC 7519)
const payload = request.user as Record<string, unknown>
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
if (typeof payload.exp === 'number' && payload.exp < now)
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'token_expired' })
if (payload.iss !== process.env.EXPECTED_ISSUER)
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_issuer' })
if (payload.aud !== process.env.EXPECTED_AUDIENCE)
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_audience' })
} catch (err) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_token', error_description: (err as Error).message })
}
}
Validation checkpoints:
- Verify
exp,iss,aud, andsubon every request — never skip (RFC 7519 §4) - Use
fastify.jwt.verify(asymmetric RS256/ES256) rather than HS256 for tokens issued by a third-party server
5. Protecting routes
// routes/api.ts
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify'
import { verifyToken } from '../hooks/verifyToken'
export default async function apiRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance) {
fastify.addHook('onRequest', verifyToken) // applies to all routes in this scope
fastify.get('/me', {
schema: {
response: { 200: { type: 'object', properties: { sub: { type: 'string' } } } },
},
}, async (request) => {
const user = request.user as { sub: string }
return { sub: user.sub }
})
}
6. Refresh token rotation
async function refreshAccessToken(fastify: FastifyInstance, refreshToken: string) {
const newToken = await fastify.oauth2.getNewAccessTokenUsingRefreshTokenFlow({ refresh_token: refreshToken })
// Always replace the stored refresh token if rotation is in use (RFC 6749 §10.4)
return {
accessToken: newToken.token.access_token,
refreshToken: newToken.token.refresh_token ?? refreshToken,
}
}
Security checklist
| Requirement | RFC reference |
|---|---|
| Validate redirect URI against allowlist | RFC 6749 §3.1.2 |
| PKCE (S256) for all public clients | RFC 7636 §4.2 |
Validate state to prevent CSRF |
RFC 6749 §10.12 |
Validate iss, aud, exp on every JWT |
RFC 7519 §4 |
| Rotate refresh tokens on every use | RFC 6749 §10.4 |
| Use HTTPS everywhere; reject HTTP redirect URIs | RFC 6749 §3.1.2.1 |
| Rate-limit token endpoints | OAuth 2.1 §7 |
Common anti-patterns
- Storing tokens in localStorage — use
HttpOnly,Secure,SameSite=Strictcookies instead - Skipping audience validation — allows token reuse across services
- Using implicit flow — deprecated in OAuth 2.1; use authorization code + PKCE
- Accepting
response_type=tokenin browser apps — tokens in URL fragments leak in logs/referrers - Symmetric signing (HS256) for third-party tokens — use RS256/ES256 with JWKS endpoint
Further implementation references
- See
DEVICE_FLOW.mdfor device authorization flow (RFC 8628) implementation - See
TOKEN_VALIDATION.mdfor JWKS rotation, caching strategies, and opaque token introspection - See
CLIENT_CREDENTIALS.mdfor machine-to-machine service authentication patterns - See
MOBILE_OAUTH.mdfor native/mobile app flows (RFC 8252) and custom URI schemes
Weekly Installs
167
Repository
mcollina/skillsGitHub Stars
1.4K
First Seen
Jan 31, 2026
Security Audits
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