ai-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a delegation pattern that retrieves executable commands from dynamic, external, and potentially untrusted sources such as
mcp__perplexity__searchandWebSearch. These retrieved instructions are then passed to theBashtool for execution, creating a direct vector for Remote Code Execution if the external content is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform system-level operations, including package detection vianpm list -g, environment checks withcommand -v, and the execution of installation/update scripts retrieved at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from external sources, including documentation maps from
code.claude.comand results from third-party search engines. These downloads are used to determine which commands the agent should execute. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
mcp__perplexity__search,WebSearch, and externalSkillcalls as defined inSKILL.md. Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts within the fetched data. Capability inventory: The skill utilizesBashfor subprocess execution andWebFetchfor network reads. Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not validate, escape, or sanitize the commands retrieved from the web before presentation or execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata