kiro-integration
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill exhibits a significant Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The agent is designed to read and parse content from
.kiro/specs/**/*.mdand.kiro/steering/*.md(referenced inSKILL.mdandhooks-integration.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested markdown files are provided in the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
WriteandEdittools to modify the filesystem and defines a system for executing shell (bash) and Python scripts viaPreToolUseandPostToolUsehooks. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the natural language content before it is processed by the agent or passed to the hook scripts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The 'Hooks' integration pattern described in
references/hooks-integration.mdfacilitates arbitrary command execution. The skill encourages the use of local scripts (e.g.,.kiro/hooks/validate-requirements.py) triggered by tool usage. If an attacker can modify these hook scripts or thehooks.jsonconfiguration, they can achieve persistent code execution on the agent's host environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): While the automated scanner flagged
requirements.mdand related paths as 'Malicious URLs', this appears to be a false positive triggered by the path concatenation syntax. No actual external malicious URLs were identified in the analyzed content; however, the 'sync' workflow implies potential network activity to a 'canonical model' which is not fully defined.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
- Contains 2 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata