confluent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
membranecommand-line interface to execute core functions. TheSKILL.mdfile contains a large sequence of hidden null characters (\x00) between the header and the main content, which is a form of obfuscation that can be used to bypass text-based filtering or conceal malicious patterns. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
@membranehq/clipackage from the npm registry. This package is an external dependency provided by the vendor to facilitate interaction with the Confluent platform. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it fetches and processes untrusted data from the Confluent API.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the outputs of the
membrane action runandmembrane requestcommands (e.g., topic names, record contents, configuration values). - Boundary markers: None; the skill does not use delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potential commands embedded in the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and perform network operations via the Membrane proxy.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization being performed on data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata