confluent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the membrane command-line interface to execute core functions. The SKILL.md file contains a large sequence of hidden null characters (\x00) between the header and the main content, which is a form of obfuscation that can be used to bypass text-based filtering or conceal malicious patterns.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the @membranehq/cli package from the npm registry. This package is an external dependency provided by the vendor to facilitate interaction with the Confluent platform.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it fetches and processes untrusted data from the Confluent API.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the outputs of the membrane action run and membrane request commands (e.g., topic names, record contents, configuration values).
  • Boundary markers: None; the skill does not use delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potential commands embedded in the retrieved data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and perform network operations via the Membrane proxy.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization being performed on data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 21, 2026, 04:39 PM