opencage
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installs the
@membranehq/clinpm package, which serves as the vendor's primary tool for integration management. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes CLI commands via the
membraneutility for authentication, resource discovery, and API interaction. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features misleading metadata and an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Metadata poisoning: The skill description claims to manage 'Persons, Organizations, Deals, Leads, Projects, Activities', which does not match the OpenCage API's geocoding functionality, indicating potentially deceptive or poorly maintained metadata.
- Ingestion points: Data returned from the OpenCage geocoding and reverse-geocoding endpoints.
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or isolation instructions are provided to the agent to protect against malicious content in API results.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution and proxied network requests via the
membraneCLI. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any filtering or validation for external API content.
Audit Metadata