pandoc-docx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The script
scripts/convert.shpasses all additional command-line arguments directly to thepandocbinary using the"$@"shell variable. While the script correctly uses double-quoting to prevent shell-level command injection via filenames, Pandoc itself supports powerful flags such as--filteror--lua-filterwhich allow for the execution of arbitrary external scripts or Lua code. If an agent populates these arguments from untrusted user input, it could be coerced into executing malicious code. - Evidence:
scripts/convert.shline 58:pandoc "$INPUT_PATH" -o "$OUTPUT_PATH" "$@". - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): As a document conversion tool, this skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources (Markdown, DOCX, HTML), making it susceptible to indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a document could influence the behavior of the agent reading the output.
- Ingestion points: Files located in the
import/directory or provided via theINPUT_FILEargument inscripts/convert.sh. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not implement delimiters or system-level instructions to ignore embedded commands within the files being converted.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
pandocand perform file system writes to theexport/directory viascripts/convert.sh. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input file content is performed prior to processing.
Audit Metadata