meshy-3d-printing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python's
subprocessmodule to open generated 3D models in locally installed slicer applications such as OrcaSlicer, Bambu Studio, and PrusaSlicer. These calls use a list-based argument structure that avoids shell invocation, minimizing injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches 3D model files (3MF, OBJ, GLB) and thumbnails from the official Meshy API domain (
api.meshy.ai). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User prompts, images, and the Meshy API key are transmitted to the vendor's API for generation and processing. The skill avoids scanning home directories or shell profiles for credentials, opting for environment variables or a local
.envfile. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests JSON responses from the Meshy API and parses OBJ file contents. While this provides a theoretical attack surface for indirect prompt injection, the risk is negligible as the processing is restricted to technical coordinate transformations and structured data parsing.
- Ingestion points: API task results (JSON) and OBJ model file vertex data.
- Boundary markers: None explicitly used in the construction of prompts sent to the API, though data is passed via structured JSON payloads.
- Capability inventory: File system access to
meshy_output/, network access toapi.meshy.ai, and local application execution viasubprocess. - Sanitization: The skill performs type-casting to floats for geometric data and uses standard JSON parsing libraries for API responses.
Audit Metadata