remotion-best-practices

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The file rules/transcribe-captions.md contains code instructions to programmatically install the whisper.cpp native binary and download specific models. Executing native binaries from non-trusted organizations (remotion-dev) at runtime is a significant security boundary crossing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Multiple files (e.g., rules/3d.md, rules/ffmpeg.md, rules/fonts.md, rules/parameters.md) instruct the agent to execute shell commands using npx, bunx, and ffmpeg. These instructions are used for dependency management and media processing but involve running arbitrary external code.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (LOW): The file rules/voiceover.md instructs the agent to request an ELEVENLABS_API_KEY from the user and store it in a .env file. While required for the primary purpose of the skill, handling and storing API keys via the agent context requires caution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill frequently encourages downloading packages from the @remotion/* and mediabunny namespaces. While these are part of the Remotion ecosystem, they are not listed as trusted sources and represent unverifiable external dependencies.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The file rules/tailwind.md explicitly instructs the agent to fetch instructions from an external URL (remotion.dev/docs/tailwind) via WebFetch. If the content of that page is compromised or altered, it could inject malicious instructions into the agent's session.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 22, 2026, 04:49 AM