wt-merge-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided
{STORY_ID}and{PR_NUMBER}directly intoghandgitshell commands. Without explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize these inputs, a user could inject shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,$()) to execute arbitrary commands. Additionally, using{STORY_ID}in file paths liketree/story/{STORY_ID}poses a risk of path traversal if the input contains../sequences. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The lack of input validation or boundary markers around the variables allows for potential manipulation of the agent's command execution logic via malicious parameter values.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow utilizes the GitHub CLI (
gh) to perform pull request operations on GitHub. This is a well-known service and the interaction is standard for the skill's intended purpose.
Audit Metadata