skills/michaelboeding/skills/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The script ooxml/scripts/pack.py executes the soffice (LibreOffice) binary using subprocess.run to validate document conversion. While it uses a list for arguments to mitigate shell injection, invoking complex third-party parsers on generated files is a known attack surface.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (MEDIUM): In ooxml/scripts/validation/docx.py, the skill uses lxml.etree.parse() to process XML components of Office documents. Unlike the packing/unpacking scripts which utilize defusedxml, the validation module lacks explicit protections against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. If an attacker provides a crafted document, this could lead to local file exposure.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill exhibits surface area for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it parses and processes content from external Office documents.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted XML data is read in ooxml/scripts/unpack.py and ooxml/scripts/validation/docx.py.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings were found when interpolating document data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute external commands (soffice) and perform file system read/write operations.
  • Sanitization: While defusedxml is used in pack.py and unpack.py, the lxml parser in the validation logic lacks security hardening against malicious entities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:29 PM