patent-lawyer-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (HIGH): The script scripts/markdown_to_pdf.py contains a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability. The embed_images_as_base64 function uses a regular expression to find image paths in markdown (![alt](path)) and opens those paths directly using open(full_path, 'rb').
  • Evidence: If a user or an injected prompt provides a markdown line like ![secret](/etc/passwd), the script will read that file and embed its contents as a base64 string directly into the output PDF.
  • Context: This allows an attacker to exfiltrate any file the system user has access to by simply requesting a PDF conversion.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): All agents (claims-strategist, ip-strategy-advisor, patentability-analyst, prior-art-searcher) ingest external data (invention descriptions) without any boundary markers or sanitization logic.
  • Ingestion Points: User-provided technical descriptions and patent data processed by the agents.
  • Capability Inventory: Access to the markdown_to_pdf.py script which has file-read capabilities.
  • Boundary Markers: Absent. No delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) are used to isolate untrusted user input from system instructions.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no filtering of markdown syntax that could trigger the file-read vulnerability mentioned above.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The script scripts/markdown_to_pdf.py relies on external libraries markdown and weasyprint. While these are common packages, their use in a script that processes untrusted HTML/Markdown increases the attack surface (e.g., via SSRF in WeasyPrint if remote resources are enabled).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:02 AM