Analyzing AgentScope Library
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the agent to clone the repository
https://github.com/agentscope-ai/agentscopeand install the Python packageagentscope. While it prompts for user permission, theagentscope-aiorganization is not on the predefined Trusted GitHub Organizations list. - Evidence:
git clone -b main https://github.com/agentscope-ai/agentscopeandpip install agentscope. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill reads arbitrary file content from a cloned external repository via
catandlscommands. This creates a surface where an attacker-controlled repository could inject instructions into the agent's context. - Ingestion points: File reads in
docs/tutorialsandexamplesfolders. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when reading external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
git,pip,ls,cat) and run Python scripts (view_agentscope_module.py). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the repository.
- Command Execution (LOW): The skill executes a local Python script
view_agentscope_module.pyand various shell utilities. While these are part of the intended functionality, they represent a capability that could be abused if combined with malicious input.
Audit Metadata