NYC

drugbank-database

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill suggests using the pickle module for caching parsed drug data in references/data-access.md.
  • Evidence: The implementation example uses pickle.load(f) to restore data from a local file.
  • Risk: pickle is inherently insecure; deserializing a maliciously crafted pickle file can result in arbitrary code execution on the host system.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill processes large volumes of external data from the DrugBank database (XML/JSON format).
  • Ingestion points: DrugBank XML database files and REST API responses (referenced in SKILL.md and references/data-access.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt snippets; the agent is instructed to parse and analyze the raw content.
  • Capability inventory: Includes chemical property calculation, network analysis, and data manipulation using libraries like rdkit and pandas.
  • Sanitization: The documentation does not specify sanitization or validation of the external content before processing.
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (LOW): The skill performs network operations to go.drugbank.com to download databases and query APIs.
  • Evidence: requests.get(url, headers=headers) and download_drugbank() usage in references/data-access.md.
  • Risk: While necessary for the skill's purpose, communication with non-whitelisted domains is flagged as a potential exfiltration vector.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:30 PM