prompt-engineering-patterns
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (MEDIUM): The skill provides integration patterns for RAG and template systems that are vulnerable to injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via variables such as
{retrieved_context},{user_question}, and{query}inSKILL.md(Integration Patterns and Quick Start sections). - Boundary markers: Absent. The templates use simple string interpolation (f-strings) without delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' headers, which can lead the model to follow instructions hidden in the retrieved context.
- Capability inventory: The skill references a local execution capability via
scripts/optimize-prompt.pyand theprompt_optimizerlibrary. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation for the interpolated strings is provided in the examples.
- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The code snippets rely on a non-standard library
prompt_optimizerand reference a local scriptscripts/optimize-prompt.py. If these are not vetted, they represent a risk of executing unverified logic during prompt construction or optimization.
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