azure-identity-rust

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026

Risk Level: LOWEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis

The skill consists of two markdown files: SKILL.md and references/acceptance-criteria.md. Both files primarily serve as documentation and provide Rust code examples for using the Azure Identity SDK.

Threat Detection:

  • Prompt Injection: No patterns indicative of prompt injection were found in either file. The language is purely instructional and technical.
  • Data Exfiltration: The skill describes the use of environment variables for sensitive data (e.g., AZURE_TENANT_ID, AZURE_CLIENT_ID, AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET) and explicitly warns against hardcoding credentials. However, it does not contain any commands or code snippets that would read these values from the system or exfiltrate them to external servers.
  • Obfuscation: No obfuscation techniques (Base64, zero-width characters, homoglyphs, etc.) were detected in either file.
  • Unverifiable Dependencies:
    • SKILL.md (Line 13): Contains the instruction cargo add azure_identity. This command installs an external Rust package. The package's source is linked to https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-rust and it's available on crates.io. Both github.com/Azure and crates.io are considered trusted external sources. This finding is downgraded to LOW severity due to the trusted source.
    • SKILL.md (Lines 80-82): References https://docs.rs/azure_identity, https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-rust, and https://crates.io/crates/azure_identity. These are references to trusted external sources. This finding is downgraded to LOW severity.
    • references/acceptance-criteria.md (Line 3): References https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-rust. This is a reference to a trusted external source. This finding is downgraded to LOW severity.
  • Privilege Escalation: No commands or instructions for privilege escalation (e.g., sudo, chmod 777) were found.
  • Persistence Mechanisms: No attempts to establish persistence (e.g., modifying .bashrc, creating cron jobs) were detected.
  • Metadata Poisoning: The metadata fields (name, description, package) in SKILL.md are benign and descriptive. No malicious content was found in the metadata of either file.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection: The skill itself does not process external user-supplied data, so it does not directly pose a risk of indirect prompt injection. This is noted as an informational point for skills that interact with external content.
  • Time-Delayed / Conditional Attacks: No conditional logic or time-based triggers for malicious behavior were found.

Adversarial Reasoning: Both files are primarily documentation. The Rust code snippets are examples, not executable scripts within the skill's direct control. The instructions for cargo add are explicit and point to a well-known, trusted source. There are no hidden elements or suspicious behaviors that would suggest a sophisticated attack.

Verdict Justification: The overall verdict is LOW because the only identified issues are instructions to install or references to external dependencies. These dependencies, however, originate from highly trusted sources (Microsoft's Azure GitHub organization and the official Rust package registry, crates.io). The skill's own content is instructional, promotes good security practices (warning against hardcoding secrets), and contains no active threats.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
LOW
Analyzed
Feb 13, 2026, 10:25 AM