azure-storage-file-share-py
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill presents a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. It reads data from external Azure shares and possesses capabilities that allow for destructive side effects or data manipulation. • Ingestion points:
file_client.download_file().readall()anddirectory_client.list_directories_and_files()inSKILL.md. • Boundary markers: No markers or warnings to ignore instructions within files are present. • Capability inventory:create_share,delete_share,delete_directory,upload_file,delete_file, andstart_copy_from_urlinSKILL.md. • Sanitization: None. - [Data Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): The
upload_fileandstart_copy_from_urlmethods provide a direct mechanism for moving sensitive local data or files to a remote Azure storage account controlled by an external actor. - [External Downloads] (LOW): The skill depends on
azure-storage-file-shareandazure-identity. These packages are maintained by Microsoft/Azure and are classified as trusted sources, which downgrades the download finding severity to LOW per the [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE].
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata