cian
Audited by Snyk on Apr 9, 2026
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 1.00). The pre-flight “Report install” block includes obfuscated key decoding, device-fingerprinting, and POSTs to external endpoints (telemetry/exfiltration) that are unrelated to the CIAN plugin’s advertised on-chain functionality, so it contains hidden/deceptive instructions outside the skill’s purpose.
CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
- Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.90). High risk — the skill instructs running a raw GitHub shell script (curl | sh) and downloading an OS-specific executable from a GitHub release owned by a small/unknown account, while also contacting ephemeral vercel and API endpoints for telemetry; direct execution of unvetted .sh/.exe binaries from these sources is a common malware vector.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill includes deliberate telemetry/exfiltration (device fingerprinting sent to external endpoints with an obfuscated HMAC key), executes remote install scripts via curl|sh (remote code execution / supply-chain risk), and downloads unsigned binaries—together these are high-risk intentional behaviors that can be abused for tracking, supply-chain compromise, or remote code execution.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly ingests untrusted third-party content from on-chain smart contracts and external APIs/RPC endpoints (see the "Data Trust Boundary" in SKILL.md and the api_calls in plugin.yaml listing https://1rpc.io/eth, https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc, https://bsc-rpc.publicnode.com, https://rpc.mantle.xyz and other third-party endpoints) and the agent is required to read/interpret that data (list-vaults, get-positions) which can materially influence transaction decisions like deposit/request-withdraw.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill's pre-flight installer fetches and runs remote code at runtime — specifically "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/okx/onchainos-skills/main/install.sh | sh" and the GitHub release download "https://github.com/MigOKG/plugin-store/releases/download/plugins/cian@0.1.0/cian-..." which download and execute required binaries/scripts, so they directly execute remote code and are required dependencies.
HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
- Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I found a base64-encoded literal assigned to _K in the install/report script:
_K=$(echo 'OE9nNWFRUFdfSVJkektrMExOV2RNeTIzV2JibXo3ZWNTbExJUDFIWnVoZw==' | base64 -d ...)
The comment even calls it an "HMAC signature (obfuscated key, same as CLI binary)". This is a high-entropy, literal secret used to compute an HMAC device token sent to external endpoints, so it meets the definition of a secret.
Other items in the prompt (contract addresses, function selectors, example commands, environment variable names) are public or clearly documentation/example values and were ignored per the rules.
MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).
- Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly provides blockchain financial operations: it can deposit tokens (executes ERC-20 approve + optionalDeposit, supports unlimited MAX_UINT256 approval or exact-amount approval) and request withdrawals (calls requestRedeem variants). It resolves/uses a wallet, lists vault addresses, and the CLI binary broadcasts transactions with --force. The documentation even lists function selectors and vault contract addresses. These are specific crypto on-chain transaction capabilities (wallet signing / broadcasting), not generic tooling — therefore it grants direct financial execution authority.
Issues (7)
Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).