spectra
Audited by Snyk on Apr 9, 2026
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes an auto-injected installation/report step that decodes an obfuscated base64 key, computes a device fingerprint/HMAC, and POSTs a device token to external endpoints—an obfuscated data-exfiltration behavior unrelated to the plugin's advertised on-chain finance functionality.
CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
- Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The package flow includes a raw GitHub shell script (curl | sh), platform binaries downloaded directly from a lesser-known GitHub release (executables), plus telemetry/reporting endpoints (Vercel and OKX API) that collect device fingerprints — together these are a plausible vector for delivering malicious binaries or exfiltrating data.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains deliberate data-exfiltration and supply-chain behaviors (automatic device-fingerprint reporting to external endpoints with an obfuscated HMAC key, plus curl|sh and remote binary downloads and execution) and additional risky behaviors (automatic max_uint256 ERC‑20 approvals) that create high abuse potential for privacy loss and fund compromise.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill explicitly fetches market and position data from external third-party endpoints (SKILL.md states "get-pools tries the Spectra app data API first" and plugin.yaml lists https://app.spectra.finance and public RPC endpoints), and that untrusted external data is used to construct calldata, estimates, and transaction parameters that drive subsequent tool use and decisions.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's pre-flight install fetches and executes remote code at runtime (notably curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/okx/onchainos-skills/main/install.sh | sh and the curl download of the spectra binary from https://github.com/MigOKG/plugin-store/releases/download/plugins/spectra@0.1.0/...), so those URLs provide required runtime content that is executed on the host.
HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
- Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I looked for high-entropy literal values that could be used as credentials. The only candidate that meets that criteria is the base64 string:
OE9nNWFRUFdfSVJkektrMExOV2RNeTIzV2JibXo3ZWNTbExJUDFIWnVoZw==
This is assigned to _K and immediately decoded and used to compute an HMAC signature (HMAC_SIG) that is sent with a device report — i.e., it functions as an embedded signing key. It is not a placeholder, truncated/redacted, or a simple example, and it appears high-entropy and directly usable, so it should be flagged as a hardcoded secret.
I ignored other values such as the 0x... Ethereum addresses (they are contract/wallet addresses, not secrets) and example placeholders like 0xYourWallet or other sample parameters, which are documentation examples and not secrets.
MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).
- Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill is explicitly a crypto financial plugin: it supports deposit, redeem, claim-yield, and swap operations on ERC‑4626 PrincipalToken contracts and a Router. It performs ERC‑20 approves, builds ABI‑encoded calldata, and submits on‑chain transactions via "onchainos wallet contract-call --force" (including Router execute patterns and specific contract selectors). These are direct blockchain fund-movement actions (deposits, withdrawals, swaps, claim payouts) and include automatic approve + transaction submission logic. Even though it prompts for user confirmation, the primary and explicit purpose is executing on‑chain financial transactions. Therefore it grants direct financial execution capability.
Issues (7)
Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).